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FOR SUPERFUND CLAIMS: A
MODEST PROPOSAL
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)1 to establish a framework for the
efficient cleanup of hazardous waste sites in the United States. One of the
fundamental principles underlying this statutory scheme known as
"Superfund" is that, to the extent possible, those responsible for releases of
hazardous substances will pay the costs of cleanup. The result of this policy
has been a veritable tidal wave of litigation in the state and federal courts
since 1981, with potentially responsible persons (PRPs) seeking shelter from
possible exposure to multi-million dollar liability claims under CERCLA's in-
famous section 107.2
The spectre of such litigation is grotesque, indeed. Despite the legislative
attempt to expedite cleanup cost recovery by a strict, joint and several liability
system with only limited defenses,3 litigation under CERCLA has been notori-
ously slow-moving and extraordinarily expensive.4 In fact, some have noted
that litigation costs could actually exceed the costs of the cleanups them-
selves. 5 For this reason, PRPs have eagerly sought escape from the Superfund
liability crunch through various financial responsibility means.
One financial option is filing a claim under a commercial liability insur-
ance policy. The most common such policy for business and industry during
1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9657 (1982)).
2. See generally Comment, Personal Liability for Hazardous Waste Cleanup:
An Examination of CERCLA § 107, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. REV. 643 (1987).
3. See generally United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co.,
579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Korhonen & Smith, CERCLA Defendants, 31
WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 289 (1987); Warsbaur & Stansel, Civil, Governmen-
tal, and Criminal Obligations and Liabilities for Hazardous Waste, 14 TORT & INS.
L.J. 37 (1986); Comment, supra note 2.
4. Comment, Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1458, 1494 (1986); see also Whitehead, Hazardous Waste and Toxic Torts:
Handling Litigation and Insurance Coverage, 51 INS. COUNS. J. 218 (1984).
5. Atkeson, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act: An Annotated
Legislative History, 16 ENVTL. L. REP. 10360, 10368-69 n.80 (1986).
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the 1960s and 1970s was the Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) policy.'
The presence of CGLs has resulted in a second wave of litigation, this time
pitting PRPs against their insurers in declaratory judgment actions to deter-
mine the rights and liabilities of the parties under these policies. 7 The lawsuits
have forced federal and state courts to consider a number of creative argu-
ments surrounding the difficult legal issue of whether coverage exists in the
first instance, and the still more vexing public policy consideration of whether
coverage ought to exist.8 It is clear that the CERCLA cleanup scheme cannot
succeed without recovering the costs which are expended to fund superfund
response activities. Thus, the question becomes to what extent, if any, those
costs should be allocated through traditional risk management processes.
II. THE PLIGHT OF XYZ CORPORATION
To facilitate this discussion, consider the following hypothetical:9
XYZ Corp. is a small, closely-held Missouri corporation in the business of
manufacturing widgets. From 1965 through 1980, XYZ engaged in widget
manufacturing at a small plant in Pleasant Valley, Missouri.
In the regular course of widget manufacturing, several chemical solvents
are used as cleansing agents. XYZ stored these chemicals in metal drums
while operating at Pleasant Valley, and disposed of waste chemicals by bury-
ing the drums on the site. Also, during the course of the cleansing process,
small amounts of the chemicals spilled and escaped through cracks in the
floor. In 1980, XYZ ceased operations at Pleasant Valley.10
In 1982, the Environmental Protection Agency discovered dangerously
high levels of the hazardous substances used by XYZ in soil samples taken
from the area around the the Pleasant Valley plant.1 Additionally, in 1984 a
monitoring well placed on the site revealed toxic concentrations of certain met-
6. For a history of the CGL, see Hourihan, Insurance Coverage for Environmen-
tal Damage Claims, 15 FORUM 551 (1980); R. LONG, The Law of Liability Insurance,
3 app. at 58 (1980). See generally American Home Prods. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
565 F. Supp. 1485, 1500-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), ajfd as modified, 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir.
1984).
7. See generally Comment, The Pollution Liability Insurance "Crisis", 15 CAP.
U.L. REv. 677 (1986); Note, The Applicability of Liability Insurance in Hazardous
Waste Disposal, 57 S. CAL. L. Rav. 745 (1984).
8. See infra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
9. The persons and events depicted in this hypothetical are entirely fictional; any
similarity to actual persons or events is purely coincidental.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1982) defines "release" of hazardous substances as
"any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, es-
caping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the abandon-
ment or discarding of barrels, containers, or other closed receptacles containing any
hazardous substance, pollutant or contaminant). .. ."
11. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(C) (1982) defines "hazardous substances" by means
of a cross-reference to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42
U.S.C. § 6921 (1982).
[Vol. 53
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als in area groundwater. Based on this research, E.P.A. ordered an immediate
Removal Action 2 and undertook a Remedial Investigation" and Feasibility
Study concerning long-term cleanup of the Pleasant Valley site.
XYZ has been served with a complaint by the United States government
seeking $1 million in Response Costs14 for cleanup of the Pleasant Valley site,
as well as a declaration of liability for future response costs and natural re-
sources damage.'"
During the period of alleged contamination, XYZ was covered by the fol-
lowing liability insurance policies:
1968-1970 Good Faith Mutual, $1 million limit.
1970-1971 Good Hands Ins. Co., $2 million limit.
1971-1976 Joe's Ins. Co., $1 million primary,
$2 million excess limit.
1976-1978 Condition Precedent Casualty, $1 million
primary; Nice Guys Mutual, $1 million
excess.
1978-1980 Good Hands, $3 million "umbrella"
After XYZ filed its notices of claims, each of these insurers, as have most
in similar situations, decided to "run for cover rather than coverage." 8 XYZ's
registered agent received a second summons and complaint, from Good Hands,
naming XYZ and the other insurers as parties defendant, seeking a declara-
tion of noncoverage under the policies it issued to XYZ. The stage is set for a
typical declaratory judgment battle over the applicability of CGL insurance
policies to hazardous waste cleanup claims.'1
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1982) defines "removal" as "the cleanup or removal
of released hazardous substances from the environment, . . . such actions as may be
necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous
substances, the disposal of removed material. .. ."
13. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1982) defines "remedial action" as "those actions
consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions in
the event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environ-
ment... [to prevent] substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare..
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1982). Judicial construction of this term has been
very broad. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d
726, 732 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); see also United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 850 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1982) concerns liability for damage to natural
resources. Future response costs are recoverable either by the government, United
States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983), or by private parties, United
States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
16. Sandoz, Inc. v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 554 F. Supp. 275, 278
(D.N.J. 1983).
17. Note that the scenario outlined in this hypothetical fairly represents that oc-
curing in reported cases. See, e.g., Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325
(4th Cir. 1986); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71 (E.D.
1988]
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III. OVERVIEW OF INSURANCE CONCEPTS
In order to understand the issues facing the district court in the fictional
Good Hands v. XYZ litigation, it is necessary to discuss some basic concepts
of insurance law. These "canons of construction" are essential in understand-
ing the interaction between the public policies relevant in hazardous waste
-liability insurance cases.
Initially, it should be noted that insurance policies are, in the most funda-
mental sense, contracts. They are subject to the same rules of construction as
ordinary contracts, at least in the first instance. As with all contracts, lan-
guage in insurance policies will be given "its ordinary meaning and effect" in
the absence of ambiguity.ls
The unique feature of insurance contracts, however, is their "adhesive"
character; that is, insurance policies are issued to an insured on "a "take it or
leave it" basis." This lack of meaningful bargaining over important policy
terms makes it less difficult for courts to find the requisite "ambiguity" to
trigger the opportunity for judicial construction. It is with this in mind that
spc -ial scrutiny is given to terms in insurance contracts by which an insurer
seeks to avoid coverage. The oft-mentioned canons include construction of pol-
icy terms in the manner which "maximizes coverage" 0 ; construction of am-
biguous terms 'strongly against the insurer 21; and the applicability of these
rules even when the insured is a commercial entity, presumably sophisticated
in contract negotiations."
These rules of construction are of paramount importance when discussing
exclusionary clauses, or conditions subsequent, designed to avoid coverage in
instances where it would otherwise exist. Such restrictions are given the strict-
est judicial scrutiny.23 Moreover, the burden rests with the insurer to demon-
strate the factual applicability of the clauses,2 4 and to do so "clearly and
unambiguously. ' 25 As one court has observed:
Mich. 1987); Fischer & Porter Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 656 F. Supp. 132 (E.D.
Pa. 1986).
18. Pearce v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 637 F.2d 536, 539 (8th Cir. 1980).
19. Estrin Constr. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d 413, 418-19
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
20. Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 811
F.2d 1180, 1192 n.29 (8th Cir. 1987); Bellamy' v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 651
S.W.2d 490, 496 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
21. Missouri Terrazzo Co. v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 566 F. Supp. 546, 552
(E.D. Mo. 1983) (citing Citizens Ins. Co. v. Kansas City Commercial Cartage, 611
S.W.2d 302, 307 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)).
22. See, e.g., Missouri Terrazzo Co. v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 566 F. Supp.
546 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
23. McMichael v. American Ins. Co., 351 F.2d 665, 669 (8th Cir. 1965).
24. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stallings, 523 S.W.2d 539, 545 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975).
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[W]henever the insurer wishes to exclude certain coverage from its policy ob-
ligations, it must do so "in clear and unmistakable language." Any such ex-
clusions or exceptions from policy coverage "must be specific and clear in
order to be enforced. They are ... to be accorded a strict and narrow con-
struction." . . . the burden is upon the insurer to prove that the exclusion from
liability coverage applies."6
IV. POLICY PROVISIONS OF THE CGL
Assume that each of the CGL policies covering XYZ during the period of
alleged contamination contained the following provisions:27
1. Coverage. Insurer agrees to pay, on behalf of XYZ, all sums which
XYZ becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or
property damage, to which this insurance applies, caused by an "occurrence."
2. "Occurrence" definition. Occurrence means an accident, including con-
tinuous or repeated exposure to conditions, injury or property damage neither
expected nor intended by XYZ.
3. "Property Damage" definition. Property damage means physical injury
or destruction of tangible property which occurs during the policy period, in-
cluding the loss of use thereof at anytime resulting therefrom.
4. Pollution Exclusion. This insurance does not apply to bodily injury or
property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of
smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases,
waste materials or other contaminants or pollutants into the environment; but
this exclusion does not apply if such pollution is "sudden and accidental."
The Good Hands Complaint asserts all four policy provisions as defenses
to coverage of XYZ's liability in the United States v. XYZ cost recovery suit.
Specifically, Good Hands contends that the release at the Pleasant Valley site
was not an "occurrence" within the policy definition of that term; that, even if
it was an occurrence, it did not result in "property damage" which occurred
"within the policy period;" that, even if "property damage" occurred, response
costs are not "damages" which the insured may become "legally obligated to
pay;" and, finally, even if all conditions precedent to coverage arguably exist,
the pollution exclusion is applicable and precludes coverage. Each of these is-
sues has been the subject of much litigation in the hazardous waste - liability
insurance context.
26. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental Casualty Ins. Co., 650 F.
Supp. 1404, 1408 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citations omitted).
27. The policy provisions described are fictional; they are essentially paraphrases
of the amalgam of such provisions discussed in the reported cases. See, e.g., National
Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental Casualty Ins. Co., 650 F. Supp. 1404, 1408-09
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Mraz v. American Universal Ins. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1173, 1177-78
(D. Md. 1985); Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co.,
24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1868, 1871 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
1988]
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V. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE INSURANCE ISSUES
A. Was there an "Occurrence?"
The first issue facing the district court in Good Hands v. XYZ is whether
the release28 of hazardous substances at Pleasant Valley was an "occurrence"
within the policy definition of that term. Stated differently, the court must
determine whether the escape into the environment of TCE was a phenomenon
"neither expected nor intended" by XYZ.
It is important to note that the presence of an occurrence is a condition
precedent to coverage.29 If the events in question do not amount to an "occur-
rence" as defined in the policy, the loss is not covered regardless of the merits
of the other issues in the case. Because the issue is one of coverage, XYZ
bears the burden of proving that the release of cleansing chemicals was an
occurrence as defined in the insurance policy.30
At first blush, this may appear difficult. After all, the storage, use and
disposal of toxic chemicals by XYZ at the Pleasant Valley site were both "ex-
pected and intended." In other contexts, the element of intent is fulfilled if the
actor intended the act in question, regardless of his knowledge of the results
that followed.3 ' Applying this standard, XYZ could not fit the release of con-
taminants within the occurrence definition merely because the harmful conse-
quences of the handling of chemical solvents at the plant were not known at
the time of the activity; rather, the intentional, expected use and disposal of
hazardous substances would be sufficient to disqualify the leaks from the oc-
curence classification, to prevent the existence of the condition precedent, and
thus to defeat coverage.
At least one court has so held. In American States Insurance Co. v. Ma-
ryland Casualty Co.," the district court reasoned that a release of hazardous
substances could not be said to have resulted in an "accident" where the in-
sured's "regular and continuous" activity of illegally dumping toxic waste was
the cause." The breadth of the court's holding is questionable, however, be-
cause of the illegality of the insured's activity. The court's reliance on Long's
treatise on liability insurance 4 is significant. Long suggests that a narrow ap-
plication of CGL coverage for hazardous waste cases is appropriate only where
the insured is an "active polluter," i.e., one who actually intends the harmful
results of his activity.' 5 Thus, absent illegality of the insured's conduct, it is
28. "Release" is defined supra note 10.
29. R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW: BASIc TEXT § 6.5(b), at 379 (1971).
30. Id.; United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152 (W.D. Mo.
1986).
31. This is true of intentional torts, for example. See W. PROSSER, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS § 8 (5th ed. 1984).
32. 587 F. Supp. 1549 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
33. Id.
34. See supra note 6.
35. Id. For a discussion of the pollution exclusion, see infra notes 70-98 and ac-
[Vol. 53
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doubtful that American States provides much precedent for taking a narrow
view of the occurrence definition in the hazardous waste context. In fact, in a
recent decision, the same district court held that a release of hazardous sub-
stances could constitute an occurrence, distinguishing American States on that
basis.36
This appears to be the view of the overwhelming majority of courts. Most
agree that, with respect to the insured's expectations or intentions, the focus
should be the result rather than the act. That is, if the contamination was
beyond the contemplation of the insured at the time of the conduct in ques-
tion, the release constitutes an occurrence despite the concededly intentional
nature of the acts of disposal.37 This seems to be the better view, and one
which is consistent with traditional notions of liability insurance coverage.38
Thus, it appears that XYZ will be able to overcome Good Hands' first
policy defense if it can be shown that XYZ neither expected nor intended the
damage caused by the release at the Pleasant Valley site. Assuming that both
the fact and the extent of the contamination of the soil and groundwater was
neither expected nor intended by XYZ at the time of the contamination at the
site, the subsequent release was an occurrence within the policy definition of
that term.
B. Did the "Release" cause "Property Damage?"
The next issue before the court is whether the release resulted in "prop-
erty damage within the policy period." This, like the presence of an occur-
rence, is a condition precedent to coverage and places the burden of proof on
XYZ. Absent a showing that XYZ's liability for cleanup costs established in
the United States v. XYZ cost recovery case represents "damages" resulting
from property damage within the applicable period of policy coverage, the in-
surance policies do not cover the cost recovery claim.
This issue actually involves two related subissues: first, whether cleanup
costs constitute property damages "within the policy period," despite the fact
that they are not incurred until long after the contamination; and second,
whether cleanup costs represent "damages" as that term is used in the cover-
age provision of the CGL. Unlike the "occurrence" issue, insurers recently
have achieved success with these policy defenses.
companying text.
36. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71 (E.D.
Mich. 1987). But see Grant-Southern Iron & Metal Co. v. CNA Ins. Co., 26 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1668 (E.D. Mich. 1986), where the eastern district court found in
favor of the insurer on the basis of the pollution exclusion, discussed infra notes 79-98
and accompanying text.
37. Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 811
F.2d 1180, 1183 n.5 (8th Cir. 1987).
38. Chesler, Rodburg & Smith, Patterns of Judicial Interpretation of Insurance
Coverage for Hazardous Waste Site Liability, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 9 (1986); see also
White v. Smith, 440 S.W.2d 497, 507-08 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
1988]
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1. When does the "property damage" occur?
The two cases at odds on this issue are Continental Insurance Cos. v.
Northeastern Pharmacy & Chemical Co. 9 and Mraz v. Canadian Universal
Insurance Co.40 In Mraz, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals gave the term
"property damage within the policy period" a very narrow construction, hold-
ing that "in hazardous waste burial cases such as this one, the occurrence is
judged by the time at which the leakage and damage are first discovered....
Nothing in the complaint indicates that the release was discovered any earlier
than 1981, over eleven years after Canadian Universal went off the risk."4 1
The Fourth Circuit's reasoning parallels that of District Judge Clark in
Continental Insurance. In granting the insurer's motion for summary judg-
ment, Judge Clark stated:
Although the complaint suggests that the wrongful and negligent act did oc-
cur during the policy periods, there is no allegation that the State of Missouri
or the United States incurred any loss or damage during this same policy
period. It was not until the governmental entities incurred remedial or re-
moval costs that they sustained a loss which was compensable .... Accord-
ingly, since there was no damage or loss incurred by the governmental entities
until after the policy period effective dates, there was not an occurrence giv-
ing rise to the insurer's liability for their losses.42
Under the strict formulation prescribed by the Fourth Circuit and Judge
Clark, XYZ will be unable to demonstrate the applicability of the Good
Hands policy or any of the other CGLs in effect during the period of alleged
contamination. This is because the property damage in question was not dis-
covered until long after the policies lapsed. By focusing on the point at which
the contamination is discovered and response costs are incurred, this narrow
view would deny liability coverage for virtually all hazardous waste cleanup
cases. The time of the factual occurrence - that is, the insured's activity -
ordinarily predates the discovery of the damage by many years. Moreover,
since the "property damage" in hazardous waste cases is predominantly by its
very nature latent - soil and groundwater contamination, for instance - focus-
ing on the time of discovery and cleanup will invariably lead to avoidance of
coverage in hazardous waste cases.
39. 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1868 (W.D. Mo. 1985), rev'd in part and re-
manded, 811 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 842 F.2d 977(8th Cir. 1988) (en banc). For purposes of this discussion, the initial Eighth Circuit
decision will be referred to as the "Panel Opinion".
40. 616 F. Supp. 1173 (D. Md. 1985), rev'd, 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986).
41. Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1328 (4th Cir. 1986). Note that the Fourth Circuit opin-
ion links the "occurrence" and "property damage" issues together; the case appears to
hold that there was no occurrence, but actually it holds that there was no occurrence
because no property damage was sustained during the policy period. Id.
42. Continental Ins., 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1873 (W.D. Mo. 1985). Note
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This result proved too much for the Eighth Circuit. Taking a different
analytical approach in the appeal from Judge Clark's decision, that court
found that claims for environmental contamination could constitute "property
damage" in some instances, even when the damage remained undiscovered un-
til after the policies lapsed.43 The court noted that the issue turned on the
operative point in question: "environmental damage occurs at the moment the
hazardous wastes are improperly released into the environment ... a liability
policy in effect at the time this damage is caused provides coverage for the
subsequently incurred costs of cleaning up the wastes."4 4 On rehearing, the
court en banc upheld this portion of the panel opinion.4 5
2. Are "response costs" "damages?"
The other issue is whether the incurrence of response costs by the state
and federal governments constitute "damages," as that term is used in the
coverage provision of the CGLs. The Mraz court found that they did not,
noting that "while the complaint does allege that property damage occurred,
there are no allegations that plaintiffs sustained any property damage ....
Response costs are not themselves property damages . . . .Instead, response
costs are an economic loss. Therefore, the Bissell complaint does not allege a
loss of property damage.
46
Then, in a recent decision, the Fourth Circuit went one step further in its
rejection of liability coverage for CERCLA response costs. In Maryland Cas-
ualty Co. v. Armco, Inc.,47 that court held that response costs are not legal
"damages," but rather are restitutionary amounts awarded in equity; as such,
a CERCLA cost recovery claim is "not a suit for damages against which [the
insurer] must defend and indemnify."'48
The Fourth Circuit construed the term "damages" in the CGL coverage
section as a word of limitation, positing that "if the term 'damages' is given
the broad, boundless connotations sought by the appellant, then the term
"damages" in the contract . . . would become mere surplusage, because any
obligation to pay would be covered. The limitation implied by use of the
phrase 'to pay as damages' would be obliterated. 49
The question of whether CERCLA cleanup costs are legal damages gave
the Eighth Circuit considerably more difficulty in the Continental Insurance
litigation. In the panel opinion, the majority of the court, over Judge McMil-
lian's dissent, disposed of this issue by relying on a line of United States Su-
preme Court cases holding that the federal and state governments have a le-
43. Continental Ins., 842 F.2d at 983.
44. Continental Ins., 811 F.2d at 1189 (footnotes omitted).
45. Continental Ins., 842 F.2d at 983-87.
46. Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1329 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988).
47. 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987).
48. Id. at 1351.
49. Id. at 1352.
19881
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gaily cognizable interest in all property within their territorial borders 0 and
hold that property in "public trust" for the common good. To this extent, con-
tamination of any soil or groundwater constitutes an infliction of damage to
property of those governmental entities. 51 Since the contamination in fact oc-
curred while the policies were in effect, although admittedly undiscovered at
that time, exposure of the publicly-held environment to the contaminants also
"exposed" the liability insurance policies in effect at the time to damage
claims.
Further, the Eighth Circuit panel found that the CGLs, by their very
terms, contemplated coverage of response costs. 'It pointed to the language of
the coverage section, which says that the insurer will pay not only "property
damage" claims, but all sums for which the insured becomes liable "as dam-
ages because of property damage which occurs within the policy period. '52
The panel majority concluded that the policy would cover the response costs
because the cleanup costs sought by the governmental entities in the underly-
ing litigation constituted "compensatory damages" which flowed directly from
property damage that occurred during the policy period - strictly speaking, the
moment at which the hazardous substances were exposed to the environment.5 3
On rehearing en banc, however, the court changed its mind. Judge
McMillian, this time writing for the majority, agreed with the Maryland Cas-
ualty holding that response costs are restitutionary amounts awarded in eq-
uity, rather than legal "damages," and therefore are not envisaged by the cov-
erage provision of the CGLs.54 The court stated that "in the insurance context
... the term 'damages' is not ambiguous, and the plain meaning of the term
damages ... refers to legal damages and does not include equitable monetary
relief." 55 In so holding, the majority of the Eighth Circuit en banc eliminated
the "circuit split" which had existed previously.
The original Eighth Circuit view, as expressed by the majority in the
panel opinion, appears to be the most consistent with the language of the CGL
policies and common sense. Moreover, both Maryland Casualty and the
Eighth Circuit's en banc opinion ignore the long-standing "canons of construc-
tion" of insurance contracts, the latter case satisfied to base its holding on a
conclusory statement of "black letter insurance law."5 The earlier Eighth Cir-
cuit panel decision does a better job than the second in applying the boiler-
plate CGL language to an extremely difficult factual setting with peculiar con-
siderations. As Judge Heaney noted in the dissent:
50. Id. at 1185-87.
51. Cf. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (applying the theory to
the federal government); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 207 U.S. 230 (1907).
52. Continental Ins., 811 F.2d at 1188-89.
53. Id.
54. Continental Ins., 842 F.2d at 987.
55. Id. at 985.
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The Missouri court en banc has unequivocally held that the language of
an insurance policy must be viewed in the light of the meaning that would
ordinarily be understood by the lay person who bought and paid for the pol-
icy .... The CGL Policy does not define 'damages.' If the insurer wished to
use a technical legal meaning for that term which differed from the accepted
dictionary definition, it should have explicitly done so."
The Fourth Circuit's decision, and the Eighth Circuit's en banc decision,
also fail to address two principles essential to the panel opinion's original hold-
ing. First, the respective majorities ignore the proposition that governmental
entities possess a legally protected interest in all real property within their
borders. Instead, in Maryland Casualty, Judge Chapman merely writes that
"'Damages,' as distinguished from claims for injunctive or restitutionary re-
lief, includes 'only payments to third persons when those persons have a legal
claim for damages .... ."' 51 The original Eighth Circuit panel's conclusion
that the federal and state governments' proprietary interests are sufficient to
give rise to a legal claim for property damages would have included amounts
awarded to governmental entities within this narrow view. Moreover, it is con-
sistent with the statutory scheme of CERCLA, under which all governmental
entities are considered "persons" for purposes of the statute's applicability.5"
Secondly, by focusing on the historical distinction between damages and
equitable relief, the Fourth Circuit gives inadequate attention to the Eighth
Circuit panel's conclusion that cleanup costs are a legitimate measure of prop-
erty damages. 0 In Maryland Casualty, the court rejected this argument:
Damages is a form of substitutional redress which seeks
to replace the loss in value with a sum of money.
Resitution, conversely, is designed to reimburse a
party for restoring the status quo. It might well
cost far more to restore a contaminated marsh than
it would to pay damages for its loss."1
The dissent in Continental Insurance correctly points out the inadequacy of
this response, particularly in light of applicable Missouri law.62 Judge Heaney
also notes that, under the facts of Continental Insurance, the costs of restora-
tion would be markedly less than the dimunition in real property value.63
Since the fictional District Court is bound to follow Continental Insurance
Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., as decided by the
57. Id. at 988 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
58. Maryland Casualty, 822 F.2d at 1352 (quoting Aetna Casualty & Sur. v.
Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 1955)).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1982).
60. See D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 5.1, at 312 (1973). Missouri courts have adopted
this view as well. Jack L. Baker Cos. v. Pasley Mfg. & Distrib. Co., 413 S.W.2d 268,
273-74 (Mo. 1967); Gulf, M. & O.R.R. v. Smith-Brennan Pile Co., 223 S.W.2d 100
(Mo. Ct. App. 1949).
61. Maryland Casualty, 822 F.2d at 1353.
62. Continental Ins., 842 F.2d at 989-90 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 989.
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Court of Appeals en banc, XYZ will not be covered by any of the policies in
place during the period of alleged contamination. Since the response costs do
not represent damages compensating the plaintiffs in the underlying United
States v. XYZ litigation, XYZ is not covered. All conditions precedent to cov-
erage have been fulfilled except one - the CERCLA claim does not represent
one for "damages."
This view is not without disagreement, however. Judges Heaney, Lay and
Fagg dissented vigorously from the en banc opinion in Continental Insurance,
distinguishing Maryland Casualty on the ground that it was decided under
Maryland law, and contending that applicable Missouri law dictated that the
term "damages" be read to include CERCLA cleanup costs."4 Moreover, the
Fourth Circuit's theory in Maryland Casualty has been rejected by a United
States District Court in Delaware 5 and roundly criticized by another in Mich-
igan.6" In the latter case, the District Judge observed:
In this context the argument concerning the historical separation of dam-
ages and equity is not convincing and it seems to me that the insured ought to
be able to rely on the common sense expectation that property damage within
the meaning of the policy includes a claim which results in causing him to
pay sums of money because his acts or omissions affected adversely the rights
of third parties.67
Thus, although the United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari in Ma-
ryland Casualty,/ the final word on this issue may still be forthcoming. Inter-
estingly, the United States government filed an amicus brief in support of the
insured's position in Continental Insurance.69
C. The Pollution Exclusion
The only policy defense left before our District Judge is the so-called
"pollution exclusion."170 Several courts have had occasion to construe the pollu-
tion exclusion in the hazardous waste context and, as with the previous policy
defenses, the results have been mixed. It can be said, however, that a rough
majority of courts have, for various reasons, held that the pollution exclusion
does not defeat coverage. 7 1
64. Id. 987-90.
65. New Castle City v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F. Supp. 1359 (D.
Del. 1987).
66. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., No. K85-415,
slip op. (W.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 1988).
67. Id.
68. 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988).
69. Continental Ins., 842 F.2d at 984. Query whether the Solicitor General sid-
ing with CERCLA defendants is a modern day example of the old adage concerning
"strange bedfellows."
70. For a history of the pollution exclusion, see Hunter, The Pollution Exclusion
in the CGL Insurance Policy, 1986 ILL. L. REv. 897 (1986); R. LONG, supra note 6.
71. Note, supra note 7; supra note 4.
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In contrast, representative of the minority, or non-coverage, view is Great
Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. 2 In Great
Lakes, applying the "plain meaning" rule of contract construction,7 3 the First
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the language of the exclusion clearly and
unambiguously precluded coverage for property damage resulting from dispo-
sal of hazardous waste where such disposal occurred in the regular course of
the insured's business.74
A recent case followed the minority rule of Great Lakes. In Fischer &
Porter Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,7 5 the district court held that
cleanup costs incurred as a result of the insured's regular practice of disposing
of trichlorethylene (TCE) were excluded from coverage by the terms of the
standard CGL pollution exclusion.78 Like the First Circuit, the Pennsylvania
District Court found the terms of the exclusion unambiguous. The court then
focused on the "sudden and accidental" exception to the exclusion and ruled
that the insured, rather than the insurer, bore the burden of proving that the
facts fell within the exception, because its applicability was an "issue of cover-
age."' 77 The court found that the term "sudden," in the context of the excep-
tion, connoted an element of abruptness that was lacking when the release of
TCE was the result of a regular and continuous disposal practice over an ex-
tended period of time.78 By broadly construing the exclusion, and narrowly
construing the exception, the district court held that the insured could not
prove coverage under any set of facts.7 9
This minority view would defeat coverage in most hazardous waste
cleanup cases. Because it focuses on the "sudden" element of the exception,
stating that it unambiguously requires the release to have been rapid, the mi-
nority view would not cover the vast majority of CERCLA § 107 cases; liabil-
ity in the CERCLA context requires no abruptness of release.8 0 In fact, CER-
CLA contemplates cleanup and cost recovery for abandoned sites, where the
contamination has ususally been the result of seepage, leaching or other latent
conditions occurring over extended time periods.
It has been persuasively argued that the holdings in the minority view
cases are result-oriented; that courts such as the First Circuit and the Fischer
court would have ruled against the insured even in the absence of the pollution
exclusion.81 The illegality of the insured's conduct; as in Fischer, may have
72. 727 F.2d 30 (lst Cir. 1984).
73. See supra note 18.
74. Great Lakes, 727 F.2d at 33. Note that the court also, perhaps erroneously,
says "there is no occurrence within the meaning of the policy alleged." Id. at 33-34.
75. 656 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 134. Note that this procedural allocation goes against the traditional
rule. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
78. Fischer & Porter, 656 F.2d at 134.
79. Id.
80. See supra note 10 for definition of "release."
81. Chesler, Rodburg & Smith, supra note 38, at 45.
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also been a significant factor in denying coverage.82 Query whether minority
view jurisdictions would be so quick to deny coverage in a case involving !'w-
ful disposal.
The majority, or pro-coverage, view uses several different theories to miti-
gate the harshness of the pollution exclusion. Some courts have noted a logical
inconsistency between the language of the exclusion and that of the occurrence
definition, noting that "liability insurance policies cover an occurrence, which
by policy definition includes conditions continuing in nature, while the pollu-
tion exclusion clause excludes coverage unless the escape is sudden. Both pro-
positions cannot be simultaneously true and the policy may be ambiguous. '83
Having found the requisite ambiguity, these courts invoke the contra proferen-
turn canon of construction and ignore the exclusion.84
Other majority view courts attempt to reconcile the exclusion's narrow
"sudden and accidental" exception with its broad occurrence definition. In
particular, a line of New York cases offers the theory that the word "sudden"
does not necessarily connote "abruptness." 85 Rather, these cases conclude that
the word sudden is subject to two possible definitions:
contrary to the insurers' assertion that "sudden" connotes "almost instantane-
ous," the word "sudden" is not defined in the policy and that the primary
definition in a dictionary emphasizes unforseeability with a secondary mean-
ing emphasizing speed .... where a term in the pollution exclusion is suscept-
able to two reasonable interpretations, the one most favorable to the insured
must be adopted.86
This view has been criticized as a disguise for result-oriented judicial
emasculation of the pollution exclusion; "with this focus, courts have effec-
tively read out of the exclusion any requirement of suddenness." 87 On the
other hand, it may be just another effort at applying boilerplate policy lan-
guage to unique factual situations involving peculiar considerations. For exam-
ple, courts in the "New York line" have noted that "the word 'discharge'
82. Note that illegality was also an important factor in the decision of the Amer-
ican States court's holding that the release of hazardous substances was not an "occur-
rence." See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
83. United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152, 204 (W.D. Mo.
1986) (citing United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake Union, Inc., 34 Wash. Ct. App.
708, 664 P.2d 1262 (Ct. App. 1983)).
84. See, e.g., Payne v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 625 F. Supp. 1189
(S.D. Fla. 1985); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvent & Chem. Co., 17 Oh.
App. 3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227 (Ct. App. 1984).
85. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental Casualty Ins. Co., 650 F.
Supp. 1404 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 80 A.D.2d 415,
439 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1981); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486, 426
N.Y.S.2d 603 (1980).
86. Conservation Chem., 653 F. Supp. at 203.
87. Note, supra note 7, at 763-64.
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clearly refers to the original release of toxic chemicals .... However, the word
'dispersal' may refer to a secondary dissemination after the original release."'88
Given the propensity of some chemicals for rapid migration and the swift flow
of groundwater in many aquifers, the requisite "abruptness" of release, while
admittedly lacking from the initial deposit of the substances, would be present
in later stages of contamination.8"
Some observers have noted that, absent the requirement of abruptness,
the pollution exclusion becomes nothing more than a restatement of the occur-
rence definition, rendering the exclusion mere surplusage.9" At least one court
has so held.9 1 The insurers find this result unacceptable, given traditional judi-
cial hesitance to construe contract provisions to be superfluous.9 2
A rejoinder to this argument is that the very intent of the drafters of the
pollution exclusion was to restate the occurrence definition, subject to a very
narrow exception for intentional polluters.93 Even some insurance industry at-
torneys have admitted that the exclusion was originally drafted to focus on the
distinction between intentional and unintentional releases, rather than between
gradual and nongradual ones, as insurers now claim.94 If this is the context, it
may be possible to reconcile the minority and majority view. If, in hazardous
waste cleanup cases, the occurrence definition and the pollution exclusion
mean the same thing, then an intentional or unlawful release, such as those in
American States or Fischer would never be covered; the release would be ei-
ther expected or intended and thus not an occurrence; or the release would not
be sudden and accidental. On the other hand, where the disposal of hazardous
substances were lawful and the contamination unintentional, as is presumably
the case in the majority of CERCLA cleanups, both the occurrence definition
and the exception to the pollution exclusion would be fulfilled. 5
Whatever basis the fictional district court uses in Good Hands v. XYZ,
the chances are good that the pollution exclusion will not be invoked to pre-
clude coverage. Although the Eighth Circuit expressly reserved judgment on
88. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bagley, 64 A.D.2d 1014, 409 N.Y.S.2d 294,
295-96 (1978) (quoted in National Grange, 650 F. Supp. at 1411).
89. This would also be consistent with the statutory definition of "release." See
supra note 10.
90. See, e.g., Note, supra note 7, at 764 (citing R. LONG, supra note 6, app. at
59).
91. Jackson Township Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186
N.J. Super. 156, 451 A.2d 990 (Law Div. 1982).
92. See, e.g., Conservation Chem., 653 F. Supp. at 202.
93. See, e.g., Hurwitz & Kohane, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Acci-
dents, 50 INS. COUNS. J. 378, 378-79 (1983); McGeough, The Applicability of Liabil-
ity Insurance Coverage to Actions Involving Environmental Damage, 1971 PROCEED-
INGS OF INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE, AND COMPENSATION LAW SECTION, ABA 312, 318-
19.
94. Hurwitz & Kohane, supra note 93, at 381.
95. This dichotomy may explain the seemingly inconsistent results reached by
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the issue in Continental Insurance,9" that court followed the majority view in a
recent case. In Benedictine Sisters v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,07
the Eighth Circuit broadly construed the sudden and accidental exception to
include the continuous discharge of soot from a smokestack over a period of
several yearsY8 Although not a CERCLA case, or even one involving hazard-
ous substances, Benedictine Sisters may be a strong signal that the Eighth
Circuit, following reasoning similar to that of the "New York line," will nar-
rowly construe the pollution exclusion in hazardous substance cleanup cases.
VI. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Having concluded that the court in Good Hands v. XYZ will likely find in
favor of insurers based upon the recent decisions of the Fourth and Eighth
Circuits, another difficult question remains: given that standard CGL provi-
sions can be read to preclude coverage for hazardous waste cleanups, should
they be so construed? This public policy debate is the crucial, though often-
times unspoken, rub of the reported cases.
A. The Deterrence Theory
The insurers argue that to provide coverage for such cleanups removes
any incentive for hazardous waste generators and disposers to improve tech-
nology and prevent releases.99 "Presumably, an insured who knows he will be
covered by his liability policy even if he is grossly negligent in preventing re-
leases of pollutants will be tempted to diminish his precautions, while enforce-
ment of the [pollution] exclusion will encourage and maintain vigilance and
reduce the risk of environmental injury. '100
In addition to the positive, deterrent, basis of this argument, it also strikes
a negative, retributive chord. It seems to suggest that there is unfairness in
placing the loss resulting from environmental contamination on the shoulders
of the insurance industry, which took no part in causing the pollution; rather
than the generators and disposers, whose industrial activities actually caused
the releases of hazardous substances. If bankruptcy and financial ruin are the
wages of sin, say the insurers, so be it.
These arguments subscribe to a number of logical fallacies, however.
96. Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 811
F.2d at 1182-83 n.3 (8th Cir. 1987).
97. 815 F.2d 1209 (8th Cir. 1987).
98. Id.
99. See generally Adler & Broiles, The Pollution Exclusion, 19 LOYOLA OF L.A.
L. REV. 1251 (1986); Rosenkrantz, The Pollution Exclusion through the Looking
Glass, 74 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1237 (1986).
100. Conservation Chem., 653 F. Supp. at 202 (citing Waste Mgmt., Inc. v.
Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986)). Note, however, that Judge
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First, it is difficult to conceive how a potential lack of insurance coverage
could affect deterrence when the harmful consequences of the conduct in ques-
tion were unanticipated and unexpected at the time it was undertaken. That is,
how can one be deterred from doing something when the potential conse-
quences are unkown to him at the time he acts? On the other hand, if one
knows of the harmful results, there is no coverage in any event; intentional
pollution is already excluded, even under the majority, pro-coverage view of
the pollution exclusion.10 1
Moreover, the idea of punishing insureds for their negligence by withhold-
ing coverage is inconsistent with the very purpose of liability coverage. No one
argues that a negligent driver's coverage should be excluded when he causes
an accident that results in serious personal injury and property damage. In-
deed, the very purpose of liability insurance is to protect the insured against
harmful future events which are unanticipated, and a "comprehensive general
liability" policy, issued to industrial entities, seems to envisage coverage "for
all manner of claims arising out of their activities."' 2
B. The Risk Management Theory
Despite any perceived public interest in the deterrence of pollution, or
retribution therefore, a strong argument has been made that insurers should
bear the loss as a means of achieving economically efficient risk manage-
ment. 10 3 The reasoning is that insurance companies are in the business of man-
aging and controlling risks, and to that extent are better able to calculate the
likelihood of potential financial exposure, ascertain financial needs in the event
of such exposure, and adjust policy terms, conditions and premiums to reflect
these factors.10 4 Under this reasoning, all hazardous waste generators and dis-
posers would ultimately bear the cost of cleanups, through higher cost, and
less readily availabile, liability coverage. This would result in spreading the
costs more efficiently and over a broader economic spectrum 0 5 Such a view
would seem to make better sense than placing the entire cost on those compa-
nies and individuals unfortunate enough to not to have dissolved or otherwise
insulated themselves from liability before the government files suit; leaving
them to the bankruptcy courts or poorhouses, while other polluters escape ex-
posure completely.'0 "
101. For a discussion of the pollution exclusion, see supra notes 70-98 and ac-
companying text.
102. Kissel v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 380 S.W.2d 497, 506 (Mo. Ct. App.
1964).
103. See Note, Encouraging Safety Through Insurance-Based Incentives: Finan-
cial Responsibility for Hazardous Wastes, 96 YALE L.J. 403 (1986).
104. See generally id.; Nixon, RCRA: Financial Responsibility Provisions, 36
AMERICAN U.L. REv. 133 (1986).
105. See Note, supra note 103.
106. See generally Note, supra note 103; Stewart, The Role of Courts in Risk
Management, 16 ENV'rL. REP. 10208 (1986).
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This phenomenon may be occurring already. Since "to date [the] attempt
by the insurance industry to address the area of hazardous waste disposal
through the use of pollution exclusion clauses has been almost entirely unsuc-
cessful,' 'I07 insurers have sought other means of risk management and control.
Recently, insurers have promulgated new commercial liability policies greatly
curtailing, if not eliminating, coverage for all manner of environmental dam-
ages. 08 For a substantially higher premium, a limited endorsement covering
some such losses is available, but even these policies expressly exclude any
coverage for cleanup costs.'09 These efforts are designed to compensate for,
and prevent in the future, the huge financial loss, particularly in defense costs,
associated with the "proliferation of delayed-manifestation claims.""'
Certainly, public policy does not favor the financial destruction of XYZ,
its officers, directors, and possibly shareholders."' Nor should public policy
seek to punish people for past negligence when such retribution would serve to
disappoint reasonable expectations arising under contracts. Finally, it is in-
coceivable that public policy should demand an uneven distribution of eco-
nomic loss throughout a cost recovery system, which might undermine the very
purpose of CERCLA: to secure cleanup of hazardous substances in the most
efficient manner possible and at the lowest possible cost to taxpayers. Public
policy supports insurance coverage for hazardous waste cleanup costs.
VII. CONCLUSION
The outlook for XYZ's defense of the declaratory judgment action is not
good. The district judge, bound by the recent decisions of the United States
Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, will likely grant the insurers' motions for
summary judgment on the basis of policy defenses. This will be true despite
the fact that XYZ can prove that the contamination at the Pleasant Valley
site was unexpected and unintended, thus showing the requisite "occurrence,"
and further that the release of chemicals at the site resulted in soil and
groundwater contamination during the policy periods, constituting compensa-
ble damage to property in which the United States has a cognizable interest.
Even though the property damage was entirely fortuitous, and thus "sudden
and accidental," none of the insurers' policies provide coverage for the re-
sponse costs in the underlying lawsuit. Such a result is untenable in light of
long-standing traditions of insurance law and modern policies underlying envi-
ronmental legislation. Although there is certainly no consenses in the courts on
107. Note, supra note 7, at 765.
108. Fitzgerald, The ISO's Commercial General Liability Policy, 43 J. Mo. BAR
383 (1987).
109. Id.
110. Mosher, Insurance Limits of Liability and Defense Costs: A Coverage
Analysis, 43 J. Mo. BAR 375 (1987).
111. All are potentially liable as "owners or operators." United States v. North-
eastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
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these issues, and further litigation is imminent, sound public policy supports
liability insurance coverage for companies like XYZ.
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